wireless sensor networks include small-sized sensor nodes with limited resources (energy, memory, etc.). Considering this limitation and their placement in unsupervised locations, e.g. military areas, and since this type of networks does not rely on a fixed infrastructure, security becomes a complex and considerable issue in these networks. Providing data and communication security requires appropriate encryption protocols. Key management is one of the most important mechanism used to secure encryption keys and their safe distribution among sensor nodes. Recently, many key management schemes have been proposed, each with its own particular strengths, weaknesses, and applications under certain circumstances. This paper investigates special requirements of distributed dynamic key management schemes in wireless sensor networks. Subsequently, modern distributed dynamic key management schemes are compared and finally, several relevant recommendations are made.
Basic Requirements and Evaluation Metrics
Dynamic key management can be considered a branch of key management. All key management schemes should satisfy the following traditional security requirements: confidentiality, authentication, freshness, integrity, and non-repudiation. These requirements should be satisfied by dynamic key management schemes as well. Moreover, features and the application environment of the dynamic key management scheme highlight certain evaluation measurements. Therefore, this section defines the most common metrics used to evaluating dynamic key management in wireless sensor networks. In [10] , evaluation metrics to manage key pre-distribution are divided into security, efficiency, and flexibility. This categorization is based on the constraints of sensor nodes and networking limitations. Accordingly, basic requirements and evaluation metrics are proposed based on this categorization and the unique features of dynamic key management. We must note that among the following metrics, node revocation, forward and backward secrecy, collusion resistance and key connectivity are only applicable for dynamic key management schemes and other metrics can also be applied to static key management schemes.
Security Metrics
Dynamic key management schemes should provide secure encryption keys, such that the activities of malicious nodes are prevented within the network. When a compromised sensor node is detected, the current secret key of the compromised sensor node must be revoked and a new key generated and distributed among related nodes. The dynamic key management scheme should possess forward and backward secrecy, as well as collusion resistance between newly joined and compromised nodes. Moreover, resilience should be provided after capturing and replication nodes.
Some security metrics of dynamic key management schemes are as follows:  Node revocation: when compromised sensor nodes are detected, an effective approach must immediately eliminate (invalidate) them from the network. Such mechanisms are used to prevent compromised nodes from deviating the network`s behavior by injecting false data or manipulating the data of trusted nodes.
basic encryption operations, based on which existing distributed dynamic key management schemes are proposed, they can be divided into the following three groups [9] . Fig. 1 presents the categorization of distributed dynamic key management schemes. Distributed dynamic key management is a set of processes in which there is no centralized key controller, such as a base station or third party, involved in the rekeying process by sensor nodes. In contrast, key management is performed by multiple controllers, which can be predetermined or dynamically assigned.
Distributed dynamic key management schemes prevents a single point of failure and allows better network scalability. However, they are prone to design errors, since captured sensor nodes can participate in the node eviction process. 
EBS Based Schemes
Exclusion Basis System (EBS) [13] is a combinatorial formulation of the key group management problem in wireless sensor networks. In EBS based schemes, k keys of a set with size = + ( < . 1 < ) is assigned to each node , where n is the number of sensor nodes in the network. Rekeying is called periodically or when one or more keys are captured (or are suspected of being captured). In the rekeying process, replacement keys are generated and encrypted with all the m keys, which are unknown to the captured node. Finally, these keys are distributed to other nodes. In total, these nodes are aware of these m keys [14] .
An EBS based distributed key management scheme which is scalable, hierarchical, efficient, location-aware, and light [15] . SHELL groups sensor nodes in clusters (0 < ≤ , where n is the number of nodes in a cluster). Rekeying is only performed within these clusters. The network considered in SHELL consists of command nodes, cluster heads (CHs), gateways, and sensor nodes. Fig. 2 presents this scheme.
It is assumed that the command node is resources-rich and cannot be compromised. After bootstrapping the gateway, SHELL determines how many administrative keys are required for a cluster. Subsequently, the list of nodes and the EBS table, which includes key combinations, are sent to the command node. Command node determine a number of gateways for each cluster C to generate administrative keys. After generation, the key generation gateway encrypts these keys and sends them to head cluster [ ]. The head cluster decrypts these messages and sends their content to the cluster member nodes.
In order to refresh communication keys, cluster head [ ] sends new communication keys to its two key generation gateways. These gateways encrypt these keys with the administrative keys of sensor nodes and send the encrypted message to [ ]. Finally, [ ] forwards new communication keys to the nodes of its cluster. Administrative keys can also be changed in a similar way. When a gateway is compromised, regeneration can be managed by whether deploying a new gateway or redistributing cluster nodes with the compromised gateway among safe clusters. If a sensor node fails or compromised in a cluster, data keys should be changed for the entire cluster. The EBS-based rekeying process to eliminate compromised sensor nodes. However, EBS-based key management is vulnerable to collusion attacks [16] . This is particularly true when the value of m is selected to be relatively small (to minimize rekeying traffic). SHELL proposes a heuristic key assignment to prevent collusion and increase the number of colluding nodes to capture the entire network. Nodes with physically smaller distances are assigned key combinations with lower Hamming distance. In order to prevent assigning key combinations with a large Hamming distance to two neighbor nodes with the same parent, key combinations are exchanged between the considered node and any node with predetermined combinations.
Despite the successful rekeying and collusion prevention of, SHELL also poses some weaknesses. First, the structure and operations are very complex, since there are various node operations and several types of keys (about 7) are used. Due to complexity, energy consumption and encryption overhead is higher than those of other schemes. Second, it is assumed that nodes have specific physical locations. However, location information in high density networks are not necessarily available. Third, by swapping key combinations, it is more likely to have two neighbor sensor nodes with the same parent to have the same key combinations, since these combinations have minimum Hamming distance. This increases the number of colluding neighbor nodes. Therefore, capturing a small number of nodes exposes most keys and leads to capturing the entire network [7] . Hamming distance based dynamic key management is proposed to solve this problem. Finally, SHELL exploits a centralized key generation gateway to perform rekeying. therefore, capturing key generation gateways provides a larger number of sensor nodes to the intruder in comparison to when ordinary sensor nodes are captured.
Localized Combinatorial Keying (LOCK) is another EBS-based dynamic key management scheme. This wireless sensor network model consists of a three level hierarchy, the base station at the top, then cluster leaders (CLs), and finally, regular sensor nodes. Fig. 3 presents the LOCK key management scheme.
LOCK employs no location information in generating new keys. In the initialization phase, sensor nodes of each cluster create a set of backup keys, which are shared with the base stations and are hidden from the cluster-leader. When a node is captured, other nodes of that cluster rekeying their keys by a local rekeying mechanism, such that the compromised node cannot communicate with them. If the compromised node is a cluster head, the base station initiates rekeying at the cluster head level. Similarly, nodes in a cluster governed by the compromised cluster leader are rekeyed with the base station. In contrast to other dynamic key management schemes, in LOCK, capturing a node (including the cluster leader) has no effect on the common operations of other clusters. Since, nodes locally rekeyed, LOCK can reduce time delay and energy consumption used for the cluster key generation and renewal.
Ref. [17] proposed a batch key scheme, which defines three operations for member nodes, including join, leave with collusion-resistance, and leave with collusion-free. 
PCGR Based Schemes
Polynomial Secret-Sharing-Based Rekeying (PCGR) [18] is a family of collaboration-based and pre-distribution group rekeying, which was proposed to solve the problem of node compromise. In PCGR-based scheme, sensor nodes are randomly assigned to several groups and the nodes of each group share a unique key. Accordingly, the two Basic PCGR-based (B-PCGR) and Cascading PCGR-based (C-PCGR) rekeying schemes were proposed. In B-PCGR, neighbors in a one-hop distance must collaborate to protect the polynomials of their group`s key. However, if a node like u and a number of its one-hop neighbors based on a specific threshold ( + 1, where u is a parameter picked by u) are compromised, the group key polynomial is revealed. In the C-PCGR, the share of a node is distributed among its multi-hop neighbors, was proposed to address the above mentioned limitation of B-PCGR and achieve higher resistance against node compromise.
In the B-PCGR, before the deployment of sensor nodes, a setup server determines the total number of groups and every node is preloaded with the group key polynomial (a unique s-degree univariate g-polynomial) of its group. After detecting neighbors, sensor u randomly picks a bivariate e-polynomial (called encryption polynomial, e.g. ( . )) to encrypt its g-polynomial, (e.g. g(x)), which result in the encrypted g-polynomial: g'-polynomial (e.g. '( )). Encryption is performed in form of '( ) = ( ) + ( . ). After encryption, node u distributes shares of ( . ) to its direct neighbors , (0 ≤ < where n is the number of neighbors). Specifically, each neighbor receives a share ( . ) from node u. after the shares distribution process, each node u keeps '( ) in its memory and removes ( . ) and ( ). The PCGR is assumed that to be loosely time synchronized and group rekeying is lunched by each node
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periodically. Each node keeps a variable called the current group key version (denoted as c), which is initialized as 0 when the node is deployed. When it is time to update group keys, each innocent node increases its current group key version by one, and returns its share ( . ), to each trusted node u. After receiving + 1 shares, which are denoted as . . . = 0. … . , u constructs a unique µ-degree polynomial, and finally, computes the new group key ( ) = '( ) − ( . ).
The C-PCGR was proposed based on B-PCGR-based, however, it differs from B-PCGR in the encryption and distribution of the polynomial shares and key updating phase. In the C-PCGR, the e-polynomial shares of a sensor node u is distributed to its multi-hop neighbors, while e-polynomial shares are distributed or collected in a cascading way. By using a polynomial-based signature and authentication [18] , PCGR can effectively detect false shares injected by an adversary.
The PCGR schemes have five important weaknesses. First, each node has to store the secret shares of its direct neighbors e-polynomials, PCGR may not be applicable to networks with a dense deployment of sensor nodes. Second, although PCRGR can reduce the amount of traffic and relieve traffic congestions by employing a return probability for its neighbors` share [18] , the communication consumption is still too high to be applied to large-scale networks. Third, if a certain number of compromised sensor nodes continuously return false polynomial shares to a sensor node u, a DoS attack can be lunched. Fourth, if a large fraction of a sensor node`s neighbors are compromised and new sensor nodes are not deployed around it, this sensor node may not be able to update its group key and thus be isolated. Fifth, in order to allow nodes to send information during the updating process, the previous group key is still used to communication among sensor nodes during a threshold time interval after the rekeying operation. In other words, a revoked node can still use the previous group key to decrypt new messages. Therefore, forward secrecy is not guaranteed.
In [19] , proposed a cluster-based key management scheme. Instead depending on the collaboration of neighboring nodes to acquire the group key, this scheme lets CHs generate and distribute the group key to the nodes within the cluster. The total number of groups is determined by the sink node. For each group, a unique 2t-degree bivariate polynomial ( . ) is constructed, and each node (including the CH) u is loaded with its personal secret ( . ). After deployment, the algorithm proposed in [20] is adopted to help with CH election and cluster formation. Each CH uses an one-way hash function and the identifier (ID) of its member nodes to construct hierarchical keys, which are then unicasted to its corresponding member nodes. When a CH wants to derive the current group key, it broadcasts a request message to the nodes within its cluster. When this request message is received, each node u, willing to trust the CH returns its personal secrets ( . ), where y is the current group key version. After successfully receiving t personal secrets, CH derives the current group key by following the threshold secret sharing scheme [21] . Subsequently, CH unicasts the current group key to its members using the hierarchical keys.
When a compromised CH is detected, the sink node informs the members of the compromised cluster to normal node under the control of an adversary may return false shares to the CH. Using the analysis results of the rekeying protocol [22] , [23] proposed a robust pairwise rekeying protocol for hierarchical wireless sensor networks to prevent node capture attacks. The characteristic of the perturbation polynomial [24] is exploited for the proposed rekeying scheme. In [23] , the rekeying protocol can be divided into three phases, system initialization, pre-distribution of perturbed polynomials and key establishment and rekeying.
In the system initialization phase, a large prime number q and the minimal integer l, which satisfy 2 > , are chosen based on the size of the network. An offline authority arbitrarily constructs a bivariate symmetric polynomial ( . ). Subsequently, the method described in [24] is used to construct the legitimate ID set S for sensor nodes and generate the perturbation polynomial set Φ. Regarding a positive integer r < , any polynomial Φ( ) must satisfy:
In the pre-distribution of perturbed polynomials phase, before deployment, each cluster head needs to be loaded with a unique ID, ∈ and a perturbed polynomial:
Similarly, each sensor node (SN) m is also preloaded with a unique ID ∈ and a perturbed polynomial:
In addition to the unique ID and the perturbed polynomial, all sensor devices (SNs or CHs) are equipped with an one-way hash function, , the returned hashed value of which is based on the most significant bits of . In [23] , the main pairwise key establishment is treated as a rekeying process. After the construction of the hierarchical network, randomly generates a new t-degree univariate rekeying polynomial function , at the begin of each rekeying phase. For each of its member sensor nodes , updates the corresponding pairwise key . = − ( ). At the same time, uses the newly generated and the preloaded polynomial to construct a master polynomial:
Subsequently, the CH broadcasts its ID and the master polynomial to all of its member nodes.
After receiving the broadcast message, each evaluates the preloaded polynomial and the received separately. During the evaluation, three candidate keys are calculated [23] . An encoded message .
. is sent using piggybacking from to . For , one of the previously calculated candidate keys that can successfully decode this message will be determined as the new pairwise key.
In comparison with traditional polynomial based rekeying protocols, the proposed scheme is achieve higher robustness against node capture attacks. Performance analysis results in this work show that their proposed protocol outperforms [22] in terms of the total computation complexity and total communication overhead. Compared to [22] , the compromised-resilient pairwise rekeying scheme achieves both forward and backward secrecy. However, it does not indicate a method to revoke captured or compromised nodes, especially for the CHs. When a CH is captured, it may lunch a revocation attack, resulting in significant traffic congestion and energy depletion. When the pairwise keys are updating, nodes may not be able to
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Deterministic Sequence-Number Based Schemes
After analyzing OMTK [5] , which is vulnerable to resource exhausting attacks and DoS attacks, [25] proposed an energy-efficient distributed deterministic key management scheme (EDDK) to securely establish and maintain the pairwise keys and the local cluster key. It assumes each node A, before deployment, is loaded with a network-wide pseudorandom function and a network-wide initial key . Also, node A has a local cluster key which is shared with all its neighbors. The initial key is used to compute the node's individual key, from which a separate encryption key and a message authentication code (MAC) key are derived. In EDDK, each node not only needs to store the pairwise keys and the local cluster keys but also needs to keep its own public and private keys. In addition, each node also needs to store a neighbor table to maintain the keys (including the pairwise key and the local cluster key) and sequence numbers. EDDK has three phase: key establishment, data transfer and key maintenance. The last phase includes key update, compromised key revocation, new node joining and mobile node joining.
In the key establishment phase, each node A computes its individual key generates a sequence number and broadcasts a network joining message to determine its neighboring nodes. Finally, the pairwise key between neighboring nodes A and B is established with the individual keys (e.g. and ) and the random sequence numbers (e.g. and ):
In the key maintenance phase, the key update process occurs when one or more nodes are compromised or when the lifetime of a pairwise key is reached. The node whose ID is smaller would generate a pairwise key rekeying message and invoke the key update process. When the local cluster key of a node reaches its lifetime, the node broadcasts a similar key update message.
When a new node N wants to setup pairwise keys with its neighbors, it broadcast a new join message. Upon hearing the broadcasted new join message, each new node W and existing node B verifies the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) [26] signature of node N. After verifying the legality of node N, for two new nodes, they can follow the key establishment phase to calculate the pairwise key between them. For the pairwise key negotiation between a new node and an existing node, the existing node B broadcasts a response message. Subsequently, with their own private key and the other's public key, both nodes N and B could independently compute the pairwise key = = . If a node A moves to a new location, it will broadcast a rejoin message. After verification, all of the three kinds of pairwise key (pairwise key between two mobile nodes, pairwise key between a mobile node and a new node and pairwise key between a mobile node and an existing node) can be computed using one's private key and the other's public key.
In EDDK, as long as the ID of a node and the sequence number field are in the neighbor table, reply attacks will fail at the receiver node. The Sybil attacks and node replication attacks will also fail because the attacker does not possess all information (the sequence numbers and pairwise key) required for message authentication. However, as one sensor node must establish the pairwise keys with all its neighbor and keep a neighbor table, EDDK may not be applicable in dense networks where each sensor node has many neighbors. Moreover, since the number of entries in a neighbor table is limited, there may be cases in which a trusted mobile node is unable to establish pairwise keys with its new neighbors and, as a result, cannot join the network. In order to defend against selective forwarding attacks, a promiscuous mode is used for each node to overhear data transmission among its neighboring nodes. However, higher energy consumption is associated with the promiscuous listening mode, which may influence the lifetime of the
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Volume 13, Number 1, January 2018 network. Table 1 compares the reviewed distributed dynamic key management schemes according to the security metrics. In Table 1 , regarding resilience, "High" means that the compromised node cannot affect non-compromised nodes, "Medium" refers to the compromised node only affects his neighbors, and "Low" denotes the compromise of one node leads to the compromise of the whole network. Table 2 summarizes the efficiency and flexibility of the reviewed schemes. Here, memory refers to the memory consumption per normal node. processing describes operations required per key generation and distribution. Speaking of scalability, "high" to that no further cost (storage, communication and computation) is induced when one node is added to the network, "Medium" implies the cost induced is reasonable, while "Low" means that high costs are generated with the addition of one node.
Comparisons
Security and efficiency are two contradicting objectives, which should be realized by the distributed dynamic key management scheme. On the one hand, powerful security protocols usually require a larger amount of memory and energy. On the other hand, the limitation in hardware resources of the sensor platform does not allow equipping sensor nodes with powerful security contributes. Tables (1) and (2) summarize the results. There is no solution, which is always the best for distributed dynamic key management in wireless sensor networks. however, there are several cases, where distributed dynamic key management effectively uses the limited resources of sensor nodes. A clear solution to improve the efficiency and scalability of most schemes is to reduce the amount of information exchanged between nodes. The cluster-based key regeneration scheme is one of these schemes [27] . In this scheme, it is not required to transfer the key of member nodes when generating a new key cluster head key. PCGR and cluster-based key management schemes can be improved in this way. Node communications cost more than processing or storage in current sensor node platforms [6] . Another observation regarding security is using public key encryption, which supports end-to-end security. This review shows that only a small number of approaches are based on public key encryption. A promising key management scheme in wireless sensor networks combines the capabilities of both symmetric and public key encryption techniques. In this scheme, each node has a public key system, which is used to establish end-to-end symmetric keys with other nodes, similar to EDDK [25] . Another critical issue that arises from this approach is the development of more efficient public key algorithms and their implementations which can be widely used on current sensor nodes [28] .
In most existing schemes, the revocation of a compromised node requires revoking a large number of keys [25] , [29] , [30] , which causes serious problems in network connectivity.
Future research should particularly find techniques to discover compromised nodes and develop efficient methods to revoke nodes. In distributed dynamic key management, it is expected that keys are periodically updated. However, none of the existing protocols have proposed a decision or analysis about the interval of updating keys. this parameter can depend on node failure, selecting compromised nodes, data traffic volume, and extra processing load incurred by all nodes. Moreover, dynamic key management in specific wireless sensor networks, e.g. sparse WSNs [31] and mobile [32] WSNs are still open research areas. Furthermore, the authentication delay introduced in key-chain-based broadcast authentication mechanisms cannot satisfy real-time applications. There are many potential ways to disrupt the time-synchronization required in broadcast authentication techniques. Therefore, the development of time-synchronization independent broadcast authentication mechanisms is another promising domain for researchers.
Conclusion
This paper reviewed modern distributed dynamic key management schemes in wireless sensor networks. With the extensive and vast application of wireless sensor networks, key management has become a fundamental security issue considered by industrial researchers for which many schemes have been proposed so far. This paper discussed the basic requirements of distributed dynamic key management in wireless sensor networks, investigated proposed schemes for these environments, and highlighted the security and performance strengths and weaknesses. Finally, these schemes were compared based on the considered evaluation metrics. Accordingly, it is not possible to find a flawless scheme, which can perform well regarding all evaluation metrics and each pose certain strengths and weaknesses and are appropriate for certain applications. Therefore, an appropriate key management scheme should be selected based on the circumstances and environments. The main contribution of this research was to encourage more researchers to develop and improve potential proposals for distributed dynamic key management in wireless sensor networks.
